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CHAPTER 19 
Labor Relations Law 
LAWRENCE M. KEARNS 
§19.1. Introduction. During the 1970 SuRvEY year, there were but 
few important developments in the field of labor law within the scope 
of this chapter as delineated in the past.l Discussion herein is directed 
to three decisions of the United States Supreme Court,2 seven decisions 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,3 two de-
cisions of the United States District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts,4 ten decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,5 
LAWRENCE M. KEARNS is a partner in the firm of Morgan, Brown, Kearns and 
Joy, Boston, and Cochairman of the Labor Law Section of the Boston Bar As-
sociation. 
§19.1. 1 In past SuRVEYS, this chapter has considered developments in labor law 
as embodied in legislative enactments of the Massachusetts General Court, deci-
sions of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the Supreme Court of the 
United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and the 
Federal District Court of Massachusetts. See 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.1; 1968 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.1. 
2 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); H. K. Porter 
Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); ILA Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 
195 (1970). 
3 NLRB v. Magnesium Casting Co., 427 F.2d 114 (1st Cir. 1970); NLRB v. C. H. 
Sprague & Son Co., 428 F.2d 938 (1st Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Maine Sugar Industries, 
Inc., 425 F.2d 942 (1st Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Agawam Food Mart, Inc., 424 F.2d 
1045 (1st Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Athbro Precision Engineering Corp., 423 F.2d 573 
(1st Cir. 1970); Figueroa de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 
AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281 (lst Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Mechanical & Allied Production 
Workers Local 444, 427 F.2d 883 (1st Cir. 1970). 
4 Doherty v. Sylvania Pension Plan for Hourly Employees, 310 F. Supp. 1331 (D. 
Mass. 1970); New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. International Bhd. of Tel. Workers, 
74 L.R.R.M. 2685, 63 CCH Lab. Cas. ~11,152, Civil No. 69-749-J (D. Mass., filed 
June 29, 1970). 
5 Opinion of the Justices, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1153, 260 N.E.2d 740; Police 
Commr. of Boston v. Ciccolo, 356 Mass. 555, 254 N.E.2d 429 (1969); MBTA v. 
Labor Relations Commn., 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1, 254 N.E.2d 404; Bolta Products 
Div. v. Director of Div. of Employment Security, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 139, 255 
N.E.2d 357; Richmond Bros., Inc. v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 1970 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 337, 256 N.E.2d 304; Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Coolidge, 1970 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 863, 259 N.E.2d 188; Cavanaugh v. McDonnell & Co., 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
717, 258 N.E.2d 561; MCAD v. Boston & Maine R.R., 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1102, 
260 N.E.2d 159; MCAD v. Franzaroli, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 343, 256 N.E.2d 311; 
Worcester Indus. Tech. Inst. Instructors Assn., Inc. v. Labor Relations Commn., 
1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 349, 256 N.E.2d 287. 
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and various legislative developments in the Commonwealth arising 
during the 1970 SuRvEY year.6 
A. UNITED STATES SuPREME CouRT DEciSIONS 
§19.2. Enjoining strikes in breach of contract. By far the most 
significant and most discussed development in labor law in the 1970 
SuRvEY year was the case of Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 
770} in which it was held that despite the anti-injunction provisions 
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,2 a federal district court may enjoin a 
strike which is in violation of the no-strike clause of a collective bar-
gaining agreement where the dispute involved is subject to arbitra-
tion under the agreement. The dispute arose when a supervisor and 
other non-bargaining unit personnel began to rearrange food in the 
frozen food cases at one of the company's markets. A union representa-
tive insisted that the food cases be stripped of all merchandise and be 
restocked by bargaining unit personnel. When the company did not 
accede to the union's demand, a strike was called and the union began 
to picket the store. The collective bargaining agreement covering the 
unit involved contained both a no-strike clause and a provision for 
arbitration of all controversies concerning the interpretation or appli-
cation of the agreement. 
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan,3 expressly overruled 
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson,4 decided in 1962. The Court re-
viewed the collision between two federal labor law practices, namely, 
(I) the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris LaGuardia Act and (2) 
the promotion of arbitration as a means of settling labor disputes. 
The Court decided that to accommodate and harmonize the two 
policies it was necessary that the former yield to the latter where the 
strike and picketing in issue, although peaceful, violated the no-strike 
provisions of a contract and the basic dispute itself was arbitrable 
under the contract. To obtain injunctive relief, the employer is not 
first required to go to arbitration, although entitled to do so under 
the collective bargaining agreement; an employer is so required when 
seeking damages under Section 301 of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act.5 Though a number of unanswered questions remain in the 
6 The author wishes to call attention to an error in the Labor Relations Law 
chapter in the 1968 ANNUAL SuRVEY, so that a correction may be made. In the last 
sentence of §13.9 at 379, the word not was intended to be now. As thus corrected, 
the sentence would read: "The statutory amendment will now bring nonprofes-
sional employees of both types of institutions, educational and charitable, within 
the ambit of the labor relations laws of the Commonwealth." 
§19.2. 1 398 u.s. 235 (1970). 
2 29 u.s.c. §§101-115 (1964). 
3 See dissenting opinions of Black and White, JJ., 398 U.S. 235, 261 (1970). 
4 370 u.s. 195 (1962). 
5 29 U.S.C. §185 (1964). See Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery 
& Confectionery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962). 
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wake of Boys Markets,6 the decision is of particular importance in 
Massachusetts since it is so difficult to obtain injunctive relief in any 
labor dispute in the state courts.7 
§19.3. NLRB without power to impose contract terms. In H. K. 
Porter Co. v. NLRB,l the employer was found by the board to have 
failed to bargain collectively in good faith with respect to a union 
proposal for the checkoff of union dues. The board's finding was 
that the company's refusal of the clause was motivated solely by a 
desire to frustrate any agreement. The board ordered the employer 
to include in the collective bargaining agreement the union dues 
checkoff clause which the union had requested and which the em-
ployer had refused to grant. This was the first time since the board 
came into existence in 1935 that it had attempted to impose a particu-
lar contract provision upon any party. The Supreme Court held that 
the board's order was invalid since it had no power to compel a 
company or a union to agree to any particular contract term. Justice 
Black wrote the majority opinion; Justices Douglas and Stewart dis-
sented. 
Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act,2 which defines 
the obligation to bargain collectively, includes the language that such 
obligation "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or re-
quire the making of a concession."3 The Court held that the board's 
remedial powers were limited by the same considerations and that "[I]t 
is implicit in the entire structure of the Act that the Board acts to 
oversee and referee the process of collective bargaining, leaving the 
results of the contest to the bargaining strengths of the parties."4 
§19.4. Federal pre-emption doctrine: Possible re-examination. 
After a decade of strengthening and expanding the doctrine of federal 
pre-emption in labor cases, first enunciated in the 1949 case of San 
Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,! there comes the first in-
6 Prof. Theodore J. St. Antoine of Michigan Law School raised a number of 
such questions in his paper presented to the Labor Relations Law Section of the 
ABA at St. Louis on Aug. 10, 1970. 
What result if the no-strike clause is broader than the arbitration clause and 
the union strikes over a nonarbitrable issue? What result if the court enjoins a 
strike on the grounds the underlying dispute is arbitrable, and an arbitrator 
subsequently rules the strike is not arbitrable; may the union then have the 
injunction dissolved? What result if a wildcat strike (one not authorized by a 
union) is involved, and the strikers as individuals have no right to invoke the 
contractual grievance and arbitration procedure? 
7 The convening of a three-judge court is required (G.L., c. 212, §30), and the 
procedural burden of the state anti-injunction act is considerable (G.L., c. 149, 
§20C; c. 214, §§1, 9, 9A; c. 220, §§13A, 13B). 
§19.3. 1 397 u.s. 99 (1970). 
2 29 u.s.c. §158(d) (1964). 
3Jbid. 
4 397 u.s. 99, 107-108 (1970). 
§19.4. 1 359 u.s. 236 (1959). 
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dication that this doctrine may be re-examined. The federal pre-emp-
tion doctrine is to the effect that if the particular labor activity is 
"arguably protected" or "arguably prohibited" by the National Labor 
Relations Act, neither state nor federal courts may act in respect to it; 
the NLRB thus has exclusive jurisdiction if any remedy exists. In a 
dictum in a concurring opinion in a 1970 decision,2 Justice White 
suggested that, in some circumstances, only labor activity determined 
to be actually protected under federal law should be immune from 
state judicial control.3 
B. FIRST CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS 
§19.5. NLRB procedural rulings. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit had occasion to pass upon a number of 
important procedural points in respect to the NLRB's administration 
of the National Labor Relations Act. In NLRB v. Magnesium Casting 
Co.,l the court held that the board was not required to make its own 
findings of fact as to matters covered in a regional director's decision 
in a representation proceeding where such proceeding becomes part 
of a Section 8(a)(5) unfair labor practice (refusal-to-bargain com-
plaint) case. The court thus declined to follow the Second Circuit2 
and the Fourth Circuit on this point.3 
In another case, NLRB v. C. H. Sprague & Son Co.,4 the First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals upheld the action of a trial examiner in re-
fusing to permit the employer's counsel to cross-examine witnesses 
with reference to any matter which could have been produced by com-
plying with the subpoena previously served upon the employer. This 
subpoena had been issued at the request of the general counsel and 
called for the production of a number of company documents and 
records. The employer's motion to revoke was denied, and the com-
pany still failed to produce the material. The court agreed with the 
board that the provisions of Section II (2) of the act for enforcement 
of a subpoena in the federal district court were not exclusive; and where 
the employer was not contending that the information sought by the 
subpoena was irrelevant and it offered no justification for failure to 
2 ILA Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195 (1970). 
3 Justice White, in his concurring opinion. joined by Chief Justice Burger and 
.Justice Stewart, stated: "So long as employers are effectively denied determina-
tions by the NLRB as to whether 'arguably protected' picketing is actually pro-
tected except when an employer is willing to threaten or use force to deal with 
picketing, I would hold that only labor activity determined to be actually, rather 
than arguably, protected under federal law should be immune from state judicial 
control." ld. at 202. 
§19.5. 1427 F.2d 114 (1st Cir. 1970). 
2 Pepsi-Cola Buffalo Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. 
denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969). 
3 NLRB v. Clement-Blythe Cos., 415 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1969). 
4 428 F.2d 938 (1st Cir. 1970). 
4
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comply with that part of the subpoena with which it had no objection, 
the employer's intransigence justified the ruling of the trial examiner 
denying cross-examination in the interest of maintaining the integrity 
of the hearing process. The court did indicate that its view might be 
different if the company were taking a position that all the informa-
tion sought by the subpoena was irrelevant. 
In NLRB v. Maine Sugar Industries, Inc.,5 the First Circuit Court 
of Appeals held that the trial examiner, in a Section S(a)(fl) proceeding 
involving questions as to the underlying representation proceeding, 
committed error in refusing to admit evidence which came into exis-
tence after the election in the representation case but prior to the 
hearing in the Section 8(a)(5) case. This evidence concerned the high 
proportion (80 percent) of seasonal employees working in one year 
who were recalled and worked the following year. The court held 
such evidence relevant to the issue of the employees' inclusion in the 
bargaining unit.e 
The board's burden of proof was at issue in NLRB v. Agawam Food 
Mart, Inc. 1 The case involved the claim of discriminatory discharge of 
a known union adherent during a period of organizational activities 
because of his deliberate falsification of his time card. The trial 
examiner had ruled in the company's favor but the board, in a 2 to 1 
panel discussion, reversed. The court reversed the board, disagreeing 
with the board's view that the infraction was minor and stating that 
"when an employee is guilty of demonstrated misconduct the Board's 
burden of proof to show that discipline was meted out for an im-
proper reason, ... if sought to be satisfied by inference only, must be 
by a highly convincing one."B 
NLRB v. Athbro Precision Engineering Corp.9 involved a number 
of unusual and complex procedural points, but the most important 
aspect in the case was the court of appeals' adoption of a rule that the 
court's order of enforcement of a board's order will become effective in 
21 days, even if the party affected seeks certiorari, where the issues 
are "sufficiently insubstantial to indicate no reasonable likelihood" that 
certiorari would be granted, unless within that time the Circuit Jus-
tice grants a stay.1o 
5 425 F.2d 942 (1st Cir. 1970). 
6 The court indicated doubt as to the board's ruling excluding seasonals, noted 
the board's decisions going both ways on the issue which appeared to follow the 
requests of the union involved, and found an incomplete articulation of the 
board's reasoning. The court also held that the board erred in not finding a union 
letter, which attempted to pass off another union's negotiated benefits as its own 
to constitute a valid objection to the election. ' 
7 424 F.2d 1045 (1st Cir. 1970). 
s Id. at 1047. 
9 423 F.2d 573 (1st Cir. 1970). 
10 Id. at 576. The First Circuit added $500 for expenses in addition to regular 
costs in NLRB v. Smith & Wesson, 424 F.2d 1072, 1073 (1st Cir. 1970), where the 
employer's contention that a finding of discriminatory discharge was not supported 
5
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§19.6. Union's duty of fair representation. A case of particular 
interest, Figueroa de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packing-
house, AFL-CIO} gave rise to an application of the principle that 
a union has a duty of fair representation.2 In Figueroa de Arroyo, 
the court of appeals held that the union's arbitrary and perfunctory 
handling of a grievance (claiming the right to be retained on the 
basis of seniority where there was a reduction of forces) was a breach 
of the union's duty of fair representation, preventing an exhaustion 
of contractual remedies and enabling the six employees to maintain 
their suit against the company and the union. Although there was no 
"subjective bad faith, hostility, discrimination, or dishonesty" on the 
union's part, the union had not investigated or made a judgment con-
cerning the grievances. It also appeared that the union erroneously 
thought that a pending NLRB proceeding on another issue would 
protect their rights. However, because the court concluded, in an 
extensive and well-reasoned opinion by Judge Coffin, that the plaintiff's 
action against the union was properly characterized as a tort action, 
it was barred by the one-year statute of limitations for tort actions 
arising in Puerto Rico.3 The case also involved a number of issues in 
respect to the amount of damages against the employer in the LMRA 
Section 301 action for breach of the collective bargaining agreement.4 
§19.7. Maintenance of union membership clause: Employee's 
resignation from union. In an interesting and somewhat unusual 
case,1 the court of appeals upheld the NLRB's finding that a union 
had committed an unfair labor practice in seeking to have an em-
ployee discharged under a maintenance of membership clause of a 
by the evidence was frivolous and "some penalty should attach to taking up our 
time with such a meritless contention." 
Another case in which a procedural ruling was involved was NLRB v. Den-
nison Mfg. Co., 419 F.2d 1080 (1st Cir. 1969). The court held that the board 
erred in holding that the allegation of a Section 8(a)(2) complaint was suf-
ficiently broad to include a claim of domination although not specifically so 
stated; however, since the board had directed a second hearing on the issue of 
domination, the court construed the board's action as amounting to an amendment 
to the complaint sua sponte. 
§19.6. 1 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1970). 
2 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). 
3 The court commented that "Congress would be well advised to enact a federal 
statute of limitations to deal with both kinds of claims asserted here" (viz., 
the union's breach of is duty of fair representation, and the company's breach of 
the collective bargaining agreement). 425 F.2d 281, 287 (1st Cir. 1970). The court also 
suggested some possible remedies if an employee and the union should seek to 
circumvent arbitration in order to have a jury trial of a Section 301 suit. 
4 The court held that damages here propedy included lost earnings but not 
prejudgment interest, attorneys' fees, or mental damages under the circumstances 
presented in the case. 425 F.2d 281, 289-293 (1st Cir. 1970). 
§19.7. 1 NLRB v. Mechanical & Allied Production Workers Local 444, 427 F.2d 
883 (1st Cir. 1970). 
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collective bargaining agreement where the employee resigned from the 
union during the period between the expiration of the old agreement 
and the reaching of a settlement for a new agreement. The court did 
not have to resolve the question of whether a resignation prior to a 
contractual escape period might be sufficient or whether the resigna-
tion would have to be within the precise limits of the ~~scape period. 
The court indicated the likelihood that it would adopt the former ap-
proach.2 
C. DISTRICT COURT FOR MASSACHUSETTS DECISIONS 
§19.8. Suit to recover penalty for pension plan: Administrative 
failure to furnish information. In a case1 arising under the Welfare 
and Pension P1an Disclosure Act,2 an employee covered by a pension 
plan unsuccessfully sought to recover the $50-a-day penalty (assessable 
in the court's discretion) for failure of the pension plan administrator 
to furnish her, upon written request, with a description of the plan 
and an adequate summary of the annual report. The district court 
ruled that the employee's letter, allegedly constituting: the "written 
request," was not a proper demand under the statute since it sought 
"considerable information above and beyond" that required to be 
furnished by the statute.3 
§19.9. Remand of arbitration case for new findings. In New 
England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. International Bhd. of Tele-
phone Workers,1 involving judicial review of a labor arbitration award, 
the court remanded the case to the arbitration board for more definite 
findings. The court held that it is "the duty of the Board of Arbitra-
tion to make findings that support its decision and that are intelligible 
and complete." Here, the arbitration opinion was found to be "so 
vague and indefinite as to make it impossible for the Court to carry 
out its task of reviewing the award. It is in many instances impossible 
to distinguish between findings of fact and recitals and discussion of 
the evidence." 
Unless the submission agreement, or the collective bargaining agree-
ment under which the arbitration case arises, so requires, the arbi-
2 In a note to the decision, the court observed: "Had there been such a provision 
[contractual obligation imposing limitations on resignation] the union might well 
be required to show that it was injured by the prematurity of the resignation. 
Where the resignation was unmistakably adequate apart from this, it seems 
perilously close to impermissible technicality to say that a premature resignation 
does not become effective when the proper time comes." ld. at 88fi n.5. 
§19.8. t Doherty v. Sylvania Pension Plan for Hourly Employees, 310 I<'. Supp. 
1331 (D. Mass. 1970). 
2 29 U.S.C. §§301 et seq. (1964). 
3 310 F. Supp. 1331, 1333 (D. Mass. 1970). 
§19.9. 174 L.R.R.M. 2685, 63 CCH Lab. Cas. ~11,152, Civil No. 69-749-J (D. 
Mass., filed June 29, 1970). 
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trator is not required to make any findings of fact or to write an 
opinion in support of his award; his obligation is only to answer the 
question submitted to him. However, it is general practice for arbitra-
tors to write an opinion in support of the award, and this is widely 
regarded as desirable. The court's action in New England Telephone 
is understandable. If the arbitrator does write an opinion, it should 
be sufficiently intelligible to support the award. There could be a 
problem by reason of the rule that once an arbitrator has rendered his 
award, he has no further jurisdiction to act, unless the situation is 
regarded as being analogous to correcting obvious errors such as 
numerical calculations. The court's action could well reflect a growing 
concern that the judicial decree enforcing an arbitration award should 
not be merely a rubber stamp that permits avoidance of a review on 
the merits. 
D. MAssAcHusErrs SuPREME JuDICIAL 
CouRT DEcisiONs 
§19.10. Surveillance of employees: Monitoring devices. By order 
adopted June I, 1970, the Massachusetts House of Representatives re-
quested the opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court on 
the following question: 
Is it constitutionally competent for the General Court to pro-
hibit, through the enactment of House No. 5719, an employer 
from operating a closed circuit television system or any other 
monitoring device in a manufacturing establishment or factory 
for the purpose of conducting any time andfor motion study of 
any employee or employees without the express written consent 
of the employee or employees, and unless the employee or em-
ployees have first been notified that such system or device is in 
operation therein?l 
The Justices answered no. In the Justices' view, "[i]t would be difficult, 
if not impossible, to say just what forms of observation of employees 
would be prohibited by the proposed bill"2 and, therefore, it was too 
vague to meet the requirements of due process. The Court remarked 
that the current bill was not sufficiently different from one which had 
been considered a year earlier,3 and that it failed to meet constitu-
tional standards because it "sweeps too broadly."4 
Justice Spiegel, in a separate opinion, expressed a contrary view: 
... In my view the proposed legislation adequatedly describes 
the types of activities which are prohibited. 
§19.10. 1 Opinion of the Justices, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. II53, 260 N.E.2d 740, 742. 
2 Id. at II55, 260 N.E.2d at 742. · 
s Opinion of the Justices, 356 Mass. -, 250 N.E.2d 448 (1969). 
4 1970 Mass. _Adv. Sh; II5!l, ll55, 260 N~E-2d 740, 742, citi~g and quoting from 
Opinion of:tlie~'JiisUces-;'356 Mass . ..,:., -, 250 N~E,'2d 448;:.449 (1.9.69): -
8
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It is rare for a bill to be enacted by either Congress or a State 
Legislature that could not be drafted with greater precision .... 
. . . I think the language describing the types of instruments and 
activities prohibited by the proposed bill "conveys to any interested 
person a sufficiently accurate concept of what is forbidden." 
[Citation omitted.] I would "adopt that reasonable interpretation 
of ... [the] statute which removes it farthest from possible con-
stitutional infirmity."5 
It should be noted that the opinion of the other six Justices included 
the following significant sentence: 
Although we have rested our opinion on the ground that the 
proposed bill is void for vagueness, we are not to be understood as 
suggesting that the bill is one which the Legislature could law-
fully enact under the due process clause because it is open to the 
objections that it unduly restricts the right of a manufacturer to 
observe the work performed by his employees and improperly 
makes the right to such observation contingent upon the prior 
consent of the employees.6 
§19.ll. Discharge of public employee: Mitigation rule applies to 
back pay. As pointed out in Police Commissioner of Boston v. Cic-
colo,l there are now three procedures whereby a public employee who 
claims to have been wrongfully discharged may seek to be reinstated 
and recover back salary.2 Ciccolo clarifies the point that, under all 
three procedures, despite some differences in language, the rule of 
mitigation of damages applies; thus, the amount earned by the em-
ployee between the date of discharge and the date of reinstatement 
is deductible from the amount of wages lost. 
§19.12. Labor Relations Commission: Procedure to determine 
jurisdiction. In deciding that under the various statutes as they then 
stood,1 the legislature had .not placed the Massachusetts Bay Transit 
Authority under the jurisdiction of the State Labor Relations Com-
mission, the Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed the procedural point 
that a writ of prohib.ition is an appropriate method of preventing a 
quasi-judicial body from exercising a jurisdiction which it does not 
possess, and of determining whether jurisdiction exists.2 
5 Id. at 1157, 260 N.E.2d at 743, citing and quoting fr9m Kovacs v. Uudge] 
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 79 (1949). 
6 Id. at 1156, 260 N.E.2d at 743. 
§19.11. 1 356 Mass. 555, 254 N.E.2d 429 (1969). 
2 The three procedures are: (1) administrative and judicial revi·~w of the initial 
decision to discharge; (2) wriHf mandamus; (3) .order; of the Civil Service Commis-
sion. Id. at -, 254 N.E.2d at 432. See G.L., c. 31, §§43, 45, 46A; c. 249, §5. 
' .. 
§19.12. LG.L., c. 16A, ~§2; 19; c. 150A, §2(2); c. 149, §§178F,, 178G. . . 
2 MBTA v. Labor Relauons Commri., 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. I, 2.)4 N.E.2d 404· .. · 
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§19.13. Employment security law: Payment in lieu of dismissal 
notice. Under the employment security law,1 an employee receiving 
money from his employer on termination of employment "as payment 
in lieu of dismissal notice" is disqualified from receiving unemploy-
ment benefits for the period covered; if the money was "severance pay," 
he is not so disqualified. The board of review in the Division of 
Employment Security held that three months' pay received by a par-
ticular employee was "severance pay," although the employer's con-
fidential personnel manua1 called it "remuneration in lieu of notice." 
The board's decision was upheld.2 The Court noted, among other 
things, that the amounts paid to terminated employees were directly 
related to their years of service and that the company's same person-
nel manual stated that two weeks' notice was expected from em-
ployees voluntarily resigning. 
§19.14. · Employment contract: Agreement not to compete. In two 
cases,1 provisions in employment contracts not to compete were not 
enforced. In the case of a radio "talk show" announcer O erry Wil-
liams), a five-year commitment not to engage in any employment in 
radio, television, or advertising was held excessive and unenforceable. 
The individual had been in Chicago for three years before returning 
to Boston, where he began working for local radio station WBZ, and 
the restrictive covenant beyond that time was held to be no longer 
reasonably necessary for the protection of the plaintiff's (WMEX) 
business. 
In the second case, the employee was an insurance agent who had 
agreed not to engage "directly or indirectly" for two years after 
termination of employment "in the writing of life insurance."2 Within 
that period he took a position for another insurance company, train-
ing new agents to write life insurance. The Supreme Judicial Court 
held that this did not constitute the indirect writing of life insurance, 
being more akin to teaching than to selling. The Court remarked that 
"doubts concerning meaning are to be resolved against" the employer.3 
§19.15. Arbitration: Use of discovery procedures. In a case of 
first impression1 in Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court held 
§19.}3. 1 G.L., c. 151A. 
2 Bolta Products Div. v. Director of Div. of Employment Security, 1970 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 139, 255 N,E.2d 3,57. 
§19.14. 1 Richmond Bros., Inc. v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 1970 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 337, 256 N.E.2d 304; Union Central Life Inc. Co. v. Coolidge, 1970 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 863, 259 N.E.2d 188. , . . 
21970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 863, 259 N.E.2d 188, 189, quoting from the employment 
contract. , 
3 Id: at 864 259 N.E.2d at 189. For another case in which an employment con-
tract was inv~lved, but in which the: principal issue wss whether a termination. of 
employment was for substantial and materi~l cause under the contract, see Chelsea 
Industries, Inc. v. Florence, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1159, 260 N.E.2d 732. 
§19.15. 1 Cavanaugh v. McDonnell 8c Co., 1970 Mass. Adv .. Sh. 717, 258 N.E.2d.56L 
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that discovery ostensibly in aid of a New York arbitration proceeding 
may not properly be ordered. Although the case was not a labor arbi-
tration case,2 there is no reason to believe the Court would rule other-
wise in such a case. Furthermore, the Court's language was sufficiently 
broad to indicate the result would be the same if the acrbitration pro-
ceeding itself were in Massachusetts.3 
§19.16. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination: Em-
ployer not required to answer questions in commission's "Investigative 
Guide- Employment." After an individual filed charges that his 
employer had discriminated against him in allocating vacation credits 
because of his color, the MCAD ordered the employer to answer all 
questions enumerated in its "Investigative Guide- Employment," 
a memorandum attached to the subpoena. Included were questions as 
to the numbers of "Negroes, Jews, Italians, Greeks, Lit:hs and Poles" 
employed, and the specific categories in which they were employed. 
Upon a proceeding in Superior Court to enforce the commission's 
subpoena, the judge found that the information sought did not in 
any way relate to the case before him and dismissed the commission's 
bill. In a rescript opinion,1 the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed with 
a pungent comment.2 
§19.17. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination: Dam-
ages may include an amount for mental suffering. In. a proceeding 
involving an alleged refusal to rent an apartment because of race or 
co:or, the commission included as part of the damages $!~50 for mental 
suffering resulting from "considerable frustration, anger, and humilia-
tion." The award was upheld by the Supreme Judicial Court;1 and 
from the cases cited,2 the dictum is plain that appropriate causes for 
2 See G.L., c. 251 (Uniform Arbitration Act for Commercial Disputes) and G.L., 
c. 150C (Collective Bargaining Agreements to Arbitrate). The Cavanaugh case 
involved an arbitration by a security salesman against a member of the New 
York Stock Exchange under the rules of the exchange. 
8 Chief Justice Wilkins, speaking for the Court, stated: "Our conclusion is that 
discovery purportedly in aid of arbitration proceedings would not in reality aid, 
but would tend to handicap, those proceedings. We also feel that arbitration, oilce 
undertaken, should continue freely without being subjected to a judicial restraint 
which would tend to render the proceedings neither one thing nor the other, 
but transform them into a hybrid, part judicial and part arbittational. We also 
might add that it seems somewhat incongxuous to resort to judicial help for 
pre-hearing discovery after a voluntary understanding had left the entire matter 
to the determination of arbitrators." 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 717, 721, 258 N;E.2d 
561, 564. 
§19.16. 1 MCAD v. Boston & Maine R.R., 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh, 1102, 260 N.E.2d 
159. 
2 "The judge was right. A reading of the 'reasoning' in the commission's~ brief 
demonstrates how right he was." Id. at 110!1, 260 N.E.2d at 160. · 
§19.17. 1 MCAD v. Franzaroli, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. !14!1, 256 N.JE.2d !Ill.. •. •. 
2 Significantly, the Court cited, inter alia, Lombard v. Lennox, 155 Mass. 70, 71, 
28 N.E. 1125 (1891), whieh involved ·a discharge from employmc;l).t. 
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such damages could include discharge and other forms of discrimina-
tion in employment. 
§19.18. Public sector bargaining: Review of unit determination 
by Labor Relations Commission. During the 1970 SuRVEY year, the 
Supreme Judicial Court had occasion to apply to a municipal em-
ployer the rule long-established as to private employers under the 
National Labor Relations Act1 and the Massachusetts Labor and In-
dustries Act.2 The rule is that the administrative agency's determina-
tion of a unit issue in a representation proceeding is not directly 
reviewable in the courts; it is only collaterally reviewable in a subse-
quent unfair labor practice proceeding where the unit determination 
is also in issue. 3 
E. MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATION 
§19.19. Opinion of the Attorney General on women's protective 
labor laws. The most significant development in Massachusetts 
statutory labor law during the 1970 SURVEY year was not a legislative 
enactment at all; rather, it was a far-reaching Opinion of the Attorney 
Generall to the effect that many of the Massachusetts protective labor 
statutes relating to employment of women were nullified by the 
federal laws prohibiting discrimination on account of sex. Some of 
these laws protecting women in employment dated from a century 
ago.2 Although Massachusetts has added discrimination on account 
of sex to the state discrimination law,3 the Attorney General does not 
§19.18. 1 29 U.S.C. §§151 et seq. (1964). 
2 G.L., c. 149. 
3 Worcester Indus. Tech. Inst. Instructors Assn., Inc. v. Labor Relations Commn., 
1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 349, 256 N.E.2d 287. See also City Manager of Medford v. 
State Labor Relations Commn., 353 Mass. 519, 233 N.E.2d 310 (1968), cited by the 
Court in its opinion. 
§19.19. 1 Op. Atty. Gen. (Sept. 30, 1970). Those statutes declared invalid as 
to employers covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are: G.L., c. 
149, §53A (prohibiting females from lifting or carrying objects weighing over 40 
pounds); G.L., c. 149, §§56-58 (maximum hours of 9 per day and 48 per week for 
women, as well as restrictions on maximum hours on split shifts); G.L., c. 149, §59 
(restricting women's employment after midnight and prior to 6 A.M.). Those statutes 
held to be still valid are: G.L., c. 149, §§99-102 (30-minute meal period for women); 
G.L., c. 149, §55 (work exclusion for four weeks before and after childbirth); G.L., 
c. 149, §53 (pulleys or casters required if women move receptacles weighing, with 
contents, 75 pounds or more); G.L., c. 149, §103 (seats for women); G.L., c. 149, 
§54 (authorizing departmental regulations under whicll lifting core without 
mecllanical aid is regulated). 
2 For example, the 1874 statute provided that women could not work in a factory 
for more than 60 hours a week. See Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120 
Mass. 383 (1876). 
3 The Massachusetts antidiscrimination statute was amended in 1965 to preclude 
discrimination on account of sex. G.L., c. 151B, §4. In making this amendment, 
the legislature specifically provided that "nothing contained in this Chapter shall 
be deemed to repeal" any provision of Chapter 149 whicll "establishes standards, 
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rule that the protective statutes are nullified as to employers who do 
not come under the federal discrimination act. This includes only 
those employers who employ less than 25 employees. 
§19.20. Other legislation. The legislature increased the number 
of Monday holidays;1 increased the penalties for violating certain labor 
statutes;2 removed, with certain conditions, the longtime exclusion 
of domestic service from various state labor laws;a passed several acts 
relating to farm laborers;4 made special provisions as to office clerical 
employees working on certain holidays; 5 and passed a number of 
statutes in the area of collective bargaining by municipalities.6 
terms or conditions of employment which are applicable to females. . .. " G.L., 
c. 151, §9. The federal statute included no sucll saving clause. 
§19.20. 1 Acts of 1970, c. 215, amending G.L., cc. 4, 6. 
2 Acts of 1970, c. 128, amending G.L., c. 266 (fraudulent use of union seal); Acts 
of 1970, c. 213, amending G.L., c. 149, §23 (advertising for employees during labor 
disputes). 
3 Acts of 1970, c. 760, amending G.L., cc. 149, l50A, 151. 
4 Acts of 1970, cc. 509, 882, amending G.L., cc. 151, l50A, respectively. 
5 Acts of 1970, c. 734, amending G.L., c. 136, §15. 
6 Acts of 1970, c. 463, §2, amending G.L., c. 180, (municipalities permitted to 
deduct "service fees" from employees who are nonmembers; the so·called agency 
shop); Acts of 1970, c. 445, amending G.L, c. 149, §178R (if municipal em-
ployers and unions use private arbitration tribunals, the cost will be equally 
divided); Acts of 1970, c. 340, amending G.L., c. 149, §1781 (fire chief added to 
police cllief in statute which states that collective bargaining agreement provisions 
will prevail if in conflict with any regulation made by either chief). 
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